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ABSTRACT 
 
 
PLAYING FAVORITES? UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS KOSOVO AND PALESTINE 
(May 2010) 
 
Lauren Briana Miller, B.S. Appalachian State University 
B.A. Appalachian State University 
M.A. Appalachian State University 
Chairperson: James F. Barnes 
Policymakers of the United States have long been vocal supporters of the notion of 
self-determination, though they have been unable to agree on an operational definition or a 
consistent application of policy. Two of the most recent and most salient challenges to the 
United States foreign policy on self-determination movements abroad have been Kosovo 
and Palestine. These movements are both characterized by territorial, ethnic, and religious 
elements. They both have achieved a degree of political autonomy within the borders of an 
existing state. They have both declared independence from said state. The glaring 
difference is that the United States recognized the independence of Kosovo instantly, and 
has yet to recognize Palestine. The rhetoric of the United States maintains that its 
recognition of Kosovo is justified by its status as “unique” and “a special case.” Elementally, 
Kosovo and Palestine are the same. However, the United States and its policymakers have 
perceived it as different, and not for the reasons that that are emphasized. There are two 
“real” reasons that the United States has recognized Kosovo. The first reason, quite simply, 
is that with its vociferous praise of the United States, Kosovo has played to America’s 
egoistic streak, and it is being handsomely rewarded. Secondly, U.S. policymakers have 
made it evident in public speech that the state’s proximity to a resurgent Russia has played 
a critical role in garnering American support of Kosovar independence. 
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Introduction 
Concepts of nationality and nationhood have presented challenges to international 
relations since the advent of the Westphalian state system in 1648. Can multi-national 
states sustain themselves? Which nations get to be states and why? Can nations pursue 
statehood at the expense of existing states? What effect does the decomposition of states 
into micro-states have on international relations? These questions are often abstract and 
seemingly limitless, and these political riddles are enduring elements of the international 
political, social, and economic landscape.  According to former Deputy Secretary of State 
Strobe Talbott, the current predicament of self-determination movements with regard to 
U.S. foreign policy is easily understood, but not as easily addressed. He writes,  
Chechnya.  Kosovo.  East Timor.  Aceh.  Abkhazia.  Nagorno-Karabakh.  Transnistria.  
The characters and the settings are different, but the plot is the same: The people who 
live in a remote corner of a country resent, often with good reason, the powers-that-be in 
the far-off capital; they are a majority locally but a minority in the larger state; they want 
independence and are prepared to fight for it.  Sooner or later, the resulting conflict 
becomes a challenge to American foreign policy, either because of the magnitude of the 
humanitarian crisis or because of the threat to regional peace and stability-or both.1   
Two of the most recent and most salient challenges to the United States foreign 
policy on self-determination movements abroad have been Kosovo and Palestine. Both of 
these are situated on territories which are historically important to multiple nations. Both 
are characterized by ethnic divisions: Serb and Kosovar Albanian, Jew ad Arab. Both are 
                                                          
1 Strobe Talbott, “Self-Determination in an Interdependent World.” Foreign Policy. 118. (2000): 152. 
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concerned with religious cleavages: Eastern Orthodox Christianity and Islam, Judaism and 
Islam. Autonomous status and institutions of government have been increasingly 
sanctioned by the states which play host to these movements. And finally, both have 
unilaterally declared independence from said host nations. The United States welcomed 
Kosovo as the world’s newest nation with much fanfare one day after declaration of 
independence. Twenty years after Palestine’s declaration of independence, the United 
States has yet to recognize it as independent from Israel, and is approaches it with 
consistent trepidation and political vagaries. 
A historical overview is necessary here for a holistic understanding of the 
development of these movements into political phenomena which have demanded the 
attention of the international community. The Israel-Palestine situation is the older of the 
two, with its origins in the Zionist movement of the late 1800s. Zionism is a political 
movement that calls for the creation of a Jewish state in the land occupied by present-day 
Israel, the occupied territories of Gaza and the West Bank, and parts of Syria, Lebanon, and 
Jordan referred to generally in Christian texts and scriptures as Canaan and in Jewish 
writings as Eretz Yisrael. Zionist Jews believe that God promised this region to Abraham and 
his descendents and that the return of the Jewish Diaspora to the region and the 
subsequent creation of a Jewish state fulfill scriptural prophecies, which honor Jews as 
God’s most favored people. 
Theodore Herzl, a Jewish journalist born in Austria-Hungary in 1860, is largely 
credited with popularizing the Zionist movement in Europe upon the 1896 publication of a 
political pamphlet printed in German and titled “Der Judenstaat,” which translates to “The 
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Jewish State.”2 Herzl writes in his treatise that the creation of a Jewish state is not only 
predetermined by scriptural prophecy, but that it would also serve as the only viable 
solution for the prevalent anti-Semitism in European countries with a substantial Jewish 
population3 and explicates a specific plan for the creation of a Jewish state, including which 
groups and organizations will be responsible for developing specific industries.4 In the 
pamphlet, Herzl proposes the creation of a Jewish state upon an existing state and people 
with disregard for the social, economic, and political implications. Also, he presumptuously 
discusses the viability of the Argentine Republic or Palestine for a Jewish state. He writes,  
Argentine is one of the most fertile countries in the world, extends over a vast area, 
has a sparse population and a mild climate. The Argentine Republic would derive 
considerable profit from the cession of a portion of its territory to us. The present 
infiltration of Jews has certainly produced some discontent, and it would be 
necessary to enlighten the Republic on the intrinsic difference of our new 
movement. Palestine is our ever-memorable historic home. The very name of 
Palestine would attract our people with a force of marvelous potency. If His Majesty 
the Sultan were to give us Palestine, we could in return undertake to regulate the 
whole finances of Turkey. We should there form a portion of a rampart of Europe 
against Asia, an outpost of civilization as opposed to barbarism.5 
 
Herzl presumes that a Jewish presence in either of these areas would help to civilize, 
economically enhance, and generally benefit the indigenous populations, and that upon 
recognizing this contribution these populations would welcome the presence of a Jewish 
state. This apparent disregard of other groups inhabiting any particular region would be a 
continuing trend within the Zionist movement, a trend which is evident in Israeli-Palestinian 
discourse, even now. 
                                                          
2 Theodore Herzl, “The Jewish State.” 1896, 1.  http://www.mideastweb.org/jewishstate.pdf (Accessed 
November 30 , 2009) 
3 Ibid, 5. 
4 Ibid, 13. 
5 Ibid, 15. 
4 
 
 The next Zionist landmark and stepping stone in the creation of an Israeli state came 
in 1917 with the Balfour Declaration. The declaration came in the form of a letter written by 
British Foreign Secretary Lord Arthur James Balfour to Lord Walter Rothschild, a British 
politician and ardent supporter of the Zionist movement. The declaration was unambiguous 
in its profession of British support for a Jewish homeland in Palestine, a region which was, 
at that time, a part of the Ottoman Empire. Balfour states in his letter, 
His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a 
national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate 
the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be 
done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish 
communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any 
other country.6  
 
This letter is largely credited with fanning the flames of an already smoldering European 
Zionist movement. 
Shortly after, in 1922, the League of Nations officially created the British Mandate of 
Palestine, which gave the British government jurisdiction over the territory and further 
encouraged, with British oversight, the creation of a Jewish homeland in the region. The 
document states, “The Mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the 
declaration originally made on November 2nd, 1917, by the Government of His Britannic 
Majesty, and adopted by the said Powers, in favor of the establishment in Palestine of a 
national home for the Jewish people.”7 With this Britain began to facilitate and regulate 
immigration of European Jews to Palestine. Clearly, this did not go unnoticed by the Arab 
                                                          
6 Arthur James Balfour, The Balfour Declaration. November 2, 1917. 
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/balfour.html (Accessed November 30, 2009) 
7 League of Nations, “The Palestine Mandate.” July 24, 1922, http://www.mideastweb.org/mandate.htm 
(Accessed November 30, 2009) 
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population which also occupied the territory. Marked rioting by the Arab population 
occurred in 1920, 1921, and 1929 in opposition to Balfour and the British Mandate.8  
Fueled by Nazi anti-Semitism sweeping Europe in the 1930’s and 1940’s, Jewish 
immigration to Palestine sharply increased. Although the British attempted to halt 
immigration to Palestine, it continued throughout the 1940’s. Contention over immigration 
combined with a pan-European feeling of guilt and pity for the atrocities suffered by the 
Jewish community during the Holocaust of World War II added to the tension in the region. 
In 1947 the British Mandate ended and the territory was turned over to the United Nations. 
The UN passed a resolution to partition Palestine into Jewish and Arab states, continuing to 
add to the friction between the two groups and constructing the foundation for territorial 
disputes, especially over Gaza and the West Bank for years to come. Ultimately the fighting 
would engage the entire region  Syria, Jordan, and Egypt  on the side of the Palestinians. 
In spite of the regional effort, Jewish forces defeated Arab and Palestinian forces resulting 
in the creation of the state of Israel in Palestine on May 14, 1948.9 It is with this declaration 
of independence by the Jews of the Israeli state, that the portion of the territory, once 
equal to that awarded the Palestinians,  
Expanded to occupy 77 percent of the territory of Palestine. Israel also occupied the 
larger part of Jerusalem. Over half of the indigenous Palestinian population fled or 
were expelled. Jordan and Egypt occupied the other parts of the territory assigned 
by the partition resolution to the Palestinian Arab State which did not come into 
being.10 
 
                                                          
8 “Israel and Palestine: A Brief History.” June 10, 2009, http://www.mideastweb.org/briefhistory.htm#The 
British Mandate (Accessed November 30, 2009) 
9 Ibid. 
10 United Nations, “Question of Palestine: History.” http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/ngo/history.html (Accessed 
November 30, 2009) 
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 The Six Day War erupted in the region in 1967, prompted in part by residual tension 
from the 1948 conflict, as well as Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956 which 
interrupted trade to Israel.  This conflict resulted in Israel’s occupation of remaining 
Palestinian Territories, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which had been under the 
jurisdiction of Jordan and Egypt, respectively.11 United Nations Security Council resolution 
242 deemed this Israeli expansion unlawful and called for Israeli withdrawal from these 
territories. Although the 1967 War was the last large-scale conflict in the region, the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip remain at the center of territorial disputes in the region today and the 
conflicts in the region continue.  
 In 1982, provoked by Palestinian aggression toward Israeli settlements in Galilee, 
Israel invaded Lebanon with the intent of decimating the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization’s (PLO) presence in the southern part of the country, which included 
settlements, weapons stores, and training camps. This attack resulted in large-scale 
migration and massacres of Palestinian refugees.12 Lebanese forces, authorized by Israeli 
Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, decimated the populations of the Palestinian refugee camps 
in Sabra and Shatila looking for PLO fighters hidden among the refugees.13 
 In the following years, Israelis not only continued to occupy Palestine, but 
settlements continued to crop up in the Palestinian territories of Gaza and the West Bank, 
contributing to the already-existing friction between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs. This 
                                                          
11 The Six Day War, “Causes and Consequences. Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting in America. 
2007,  http://www.sixdaywar.org/content/introduction.asp (Accessed November 30, 2009) 
12 Palestine Facts, “Why did Israel invade Lebanon in 1982?” 2009, 
http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_1967to1991_lebanon_198x_backgd.php (Accessed December 1, 2009) 
13 Palestine Facts, “What happened at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in 1982?” 2009, 
http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_1967to1991_sabra_shatila.php (Accessed December 1, 2009) 
7 
 
culminated in what is known as the First Intifada, where Palestinian civilians in the occupied 
territories rioted with makeshift weapons and little organization against the Israeli 
occupiers. 14 This uprising resulted in the Palestinian Declaration of Independence in 1988, 
however, this announcement largely fell on the deaf ears of the international community. 
Because this document did not assert a Palestinian claim to all of the Palestinian and Israeli 
territories, it was widely interpreted as Palestinian acceptance of the existence of the state 
of Israel.15 
 Since the declaration, many attempts at negotiating a final solution for the region 
have been made, but none have succeeded. These proposals, fora, conferences, 
conventions, and agreements have collectively come to be known as the “peace process.” 
At the behest of the United States, an unsuccessful peace conference was held in Madrid in 
1991. In 1993 the Israeli government and the PLO convened again in Oslo, Norway. It is here 
that the "Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements” was agreed 
upon and signed in Washington, D.C.  This document states that “Israel agreed to a gradual 
devolution of power in the territories and an initial withdrawal from much of the Gaza Strip 
and the Jericho area in the West Bank, and, within three years this devolution of power, to 
enter into negotiations for a final status agreement, covering refugees, borders, Jerusalem, 
settlements, security, and Palestinian statehood.”16 
 The remainder of the 1990’s was characterized by general mistrust on both sides of 
the issue which prevented full commitment to the Oslo Accords and a stalemate in the 
                                                          
14 Benny Morris, One State, Two States. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 123-124. 
15 Ibid, 126. 
16 Ibid, 128. 
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peace process. The United States hosted yet another summit on the issue in July 2000 at 
Camp David, Maryland; again, no agreement was reached between the two parties. 
Violence broke out once again when Israel’s Likud Party leader Ariel Sharon visited the 
Temple Mount, a holy site in Jerusalem for both Jews and Muslims.17  This second, or Al 
Aqsa, Intifada lasted around two years, with little more than vocal opposition to the 
violence from the international community.  
 In 2002, the United States proposed the so-called “Road Map Peace Plan” for the 
region, which calls for an end to violence, as well as Israeli settlements in Palestinian 
territories. The goal of the Road Map is to create conditions in the region conducive to 
negotiating a final solution, and the plan remains the touchstone for discussion about the 
Israel-Palestine issue. However, with its main sponsor, President George W. Bush, out of 
office, the Road Map has fallen by the wayside.18 
 For a complete understanding of the contemporary Kosovo issue, the discussion 
must begin with the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. Yugoslavia became a 
kingdom in 1918 upon the fall of the Ottoman Empire, and reinvented itself as a socialist 
state at the end of World War II.19 Before its collapse, Yugoslavia consisted of six republics: 
Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia, as well as the two 
autonomous regions Vojvodina and Kosovo.  
 The elections of Franjo Tudjman in the republic of Croatia and Slobodan Milosevic in 
Serbia in 1990 are largely credited as the impetus for the breakup of Yugoslavia. Michael 
                                                          
17 Palestinian Facts, “What happened during the Al-Aqsa Intifada?” 2009, 
http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_1991to_now_alaqsa_course.php (Accessed December 1, 2009 )  
18 Sharon Otterman, “Middle East: The Road Map to Peace,” CouncilonForeignRelations.Org. February 7, 2005, 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/7738/ (Accessed December 1, 2009)   
19 Michael G. Roskin, The Rebirth of Eastern Europe. 4th Edition. (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2002), 31. 
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Roskin explains, “By that point, with the two strongest and least flexible personalities of 
Yugoslavia’s two leading republics whipping up their respective constituencies, breakup was 
nearly inevitable.”20 
 In 1991, Yugoslavs began to divide and claim territories according to ethnic 
identities. Slovenia and Croatia were the first republics to declare independence from 
Yugoslavia in 1991, with Bosnia and Macedonia following closely behind. All of these 
republics engaged in some degree of armed conflict with the Yugoslav National Army, which 
at this point represented Serbia and Montenegro, in defense of their claims to 
independence. In 1992 Serbia began to claim any territory with an ethnic Serbian 
population, focusing on Bosnia,  
from which they “ethnically cleansed”  the non-Serb population by the most 
unpretty of means  indiscriminate shelling of cities, rape as a weapon of war, 
property seizures forced emigration, and murder  that aroused the conscience of 
humankind. Some 200,000 people were killed in Bosnia and 3 million displaced.21 
 
Violence between Serbs and Croats would subside, however the conflict between 
the Serbs and the Bosnians would endure into the mid-1990s. The Dayton Peace Accords 
were agreed upon in Dayton, Ohio by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Republic of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Republic of Croatia. This agreement called for a ceasefire, 
international monitoring by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), stabilization of 
                                                          
20 Ibid, 168. 
21 Ibid, 172. 
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borders, free and fair elections, guarantee of human rights, return of refugees, preservation 
of public buildings and monuments,  and a constitution for Bosnia Herzegovina.22 
Meanwhile, Kosovo leadership used the fighting between the Serbs, Croats, and 
Bosnians as an opportunity to rally for statehood, something that had been the goal of the 
autonomous province since the death of Josip Broz Tito, the charismatic leader credited 
with resisting Soviet expansion and holding Yugoslavia together, in 1980. Any mention of 
Kosovo was excluded from the Dayton Agreement and the province continued to be 
recognized by the international community as part of Serbia, justifying its different 
treatment as compared with that of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, and 
Macedonia, all of which were recognized as republics as part of Yugoslavia.23 
An economic collapse in Albania caused by the prevalence of pyramid-schemed 
businesses propping up the Albanian economy, resulted in government protests and mass 
chaos.24 Weapons made available by the looting of military depots by protestors and rioters 
were funneled into Kosovo, contributing to the strengthening of the Kosovo Liberation 
Army (KLA), a group which was very vocal about their goal of Kosovo as an independent 
state.25 In 1997-98, the KLA presented resistance to Serbian forces attempting to quell the 
unrest in Kosovo. Back-and-forth violence continued between Serbs and Kosovars, each 
consistently retaliating for the other’s attacks and creating a tug-of-war of territory. 
Serbians and Kosovars incurred considerable military and civilian casualties, compromised 
                                                          
22 PBS Newshour, “Summary of the Dayton Peace Agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina,” November 30, 1995, 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/bosnia/dayton_peace.html (Accessed December 1, 2009) 
23 Michael G. Roskin, The Rebirth of Eastern Europe. 4th Edition. (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2002), 178. 
24 Robert Bideleux and Ian Jeffries, The Balkans: A Post Communist History. (London: Routledge, 2007), 54. 
25 Ibid, 537. 
11 
 
the human rights of both Serbs and Kosovars in the region, and damaged infrastructure, 
leaving the entire region destabilized. 
United States Envoy to the Balkans Richard Holbrooke brokered a short-lived 
ceasefire on October 13, 1998 which broke down after a surge in violence on December 24, 
1998.26 “It was discovered on 16 January [1999] that forty-five Kosovars (including three 
women and a child) had been killed the day before, allegedly by Serbian forces, in the 
village of Racak. Most had been shot at close range in the head and stomach.”27 This 
incident prompted the convention of the Rambouillet conference to negotiate a peace 
between Serbs and Kosovars, however, the conflict raged on and no solid agreement was 
reached and only the Kosovar Albanian delegation signed the accords. 
Slobodan Milosevic and his ethnic cleansing campaign against Kosovars garnered 
international attention.  In an attempt to end violence in the region, NATO forces began an 
air bombing campaign, dubbed Operation Allied Force, in Serbia on March 24, 1999. Upon 
Milosevic’s capitulation and Serbia’s forced exit from Kosovo, NATO assembled a 
peacekeeping apparatus known as the Kosovo Force, or more commonly KFOR. According 
to NATO, KFOR’S objectives were to “deter renewed hostility and threats against Kosovo by 
Yugoslav and Serb forces; establish a secure environment and ensure public safety and 
order; demilitarize the Kosovo Liberation Army; support the international humanitarian 
effort and coordinate with and support the international civil presence.” 28 
                                                          
26 Ibid, 541-542. 
27 Ibid, 545. 
28 NATO, “NATO’s Role in Kosovo,” November 17, 2009, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm (Accessed December 4, 2009) 
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KFOR has maintained a significant presence in Kosovo since the 1999 campaign, 
however, in 2007 the United Nations Special Envoy to the region Martti Ahtisaari proposed 
a plan for the final status of Kosovo and Serbia. The Ahtisaari plan, as it came to be known, 
called for a democratic, multi-ethnic, and constitutionally bound Kosovo, which is allowed 
to enter into international agreements and organizations, and which will also ultimately be 
an independent and sovereign state.29 
In February 2008, to a generally receptive international community, Kosovo declared 
its independence from Serbia. The United States, with virtually no hesitation, was among 
the first to recognize the independence of the former Serbian province. 
Why has the United States reacted to these movements so incongruently? Firstly, 
policymakers in the United States contend that Kosovo is a “special case,” different from 
any other self-determination movement in existence. This paper will first seek to contradict 
this notion by explaining that the two movements are, in essence, the same by exploring in 
some depth the aforementioned characteristics of territorial claims, religion, ethnicity, 
autonomy, and declarations of independence. 
The second portion of this paper will look at public statements by U.S. policymakers 
to differentiate between the rhetorical reasons and the actual reasons for the United States 
ardent support for the independence of Kosovo and not Palestine. Using constructivist 
Alexander Wendt’s theory, as developed in his article Anarchy is What States Make of It, 
this paper will explain how the United States arrived at the starkly dissimilar policies toward 
                                                          
29 Martti Ahtisaari, “Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo’s future status,” United 
Nations Security Council, March 26, 2007, http://www.unosek.org/docref/report-english.pdf (Accessed 
December 4, 2009) 
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Kosovo and Palestine, and how the rhetoric belies the likelier reasons for the United States’ 
favor of Kosovo. 
This project ultimately finds that 1) Kosovo and Palestine share the same 
characteristics and components, as well as similar histories; 2) United States policymakers 
contend in public speech that Kosovo is different from Palestine for reasons which in 
actuality make the two more similar; and 3) a further look into informal public addresses of 
policymakers and government officials reveals, in spite of the well-rehearsed rhetoric, two 
much more likely reasons for special treatment of Kosovo: fervent pro-American sentiment 
in Kosovo and Kosovo’s geographic location between the European Union and Russia.  
Since Kosovo, as an independent state, is less than two years old, little research has 
been done on the process of independence as well as the implications of independence in 
international relations. Through this project, the existing literature will be enhanced with a 
practical application of an increasingly popular theory in international relations, further 
research on a relatively recent and salient phenomenon, and examination of the 
inconsistencies in the foreign policies of the United States and the implications of these 
inconsistencies.
14 
 
Chapter I: Review of the Literature 
History of United States Foreign Policy toward Self-Determination Movements 
The interpretation of self-determination as a concept in United States foreign policy 
has evolved dramatically over the past century.  Self-determination, in the scholarly 
literature, is generally regarded as an idea set forth during the post-World War I political 
climate, and specifically credited to Woodrow Wilson.  In his “Fourteen Points” speech, 
Point V states that “A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial 
claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such 
questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight 
with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.”30 
Though he does not explicitly use the term, with that statement, Wilson 
conceptualizes what would come to be known in international law as the principle of self-
determination.  Wilson was one of the first contemporary practitioners of policy to elevate 
the idea, and did so in hopes of developing a remedy for the ills of colonialism that plagued 
the post-war and interwar periods.   
After World War I, many of the European powers were forced to relinquish their 
colonial claims.  This influenced the idea that the idea that colonized peoples have the right 
                                                          
30 Wilson, Woodrow. “Fourteen Points,” January 8, 1918. 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson14.asp (Accessed April 1, 2009)   
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to determine their own form of government and quality of governance (within 
established colonial borders, which many of the former colonies decided to let stand after 
their respective colonizers withdrew) without external interference. During this period and 
out of these ideas arose the original contemporary definition of self-determination.  This 
definition exalts the concept of territorial integrity and state sovereignty, however, not 
necessarily the sovereignty of all peoples and the right of all peoples to their own state.  The 
Wilsonian view of self-determination, as it is called, is also deliberately limited and 
politically ambiguous in that it characterizes self-determination as a principle, not 
necessarily a right. 
William Appleman Williams, in The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, offers a critique 
of the Wilsonian idea of self-determination.  He argues that although the United States has 
historically, superficially advocated for the principle, actual U.S. policy was oriented in 
economic interests; therefore, establishing new markets for American goods and services, 
encouraging dependence on the United States and undermining the ability of achieving true 
self-determination for others.   Although Williams does not necessarily disagree that these 
economic policies, under the guise of support for self-determination, were applied 
consistently under Wilson as well as his successors, he does say that there was no 
congruence between the moralistic rhetoric of U.S. policy toward self-determination and its 
policies as applied to these movements.   
Williams argues that from the perspective of U.S. foreign policy, whether this was 
the intent or not, the support of self-determination by any standards other than the way in 
which the United States came to be sovereign and self-determined was unacceptable.  He 
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argues that for the United States to support self-determination in practice, as it did in 
rhetoric, would not serve the economic intent of the United States. He claims that economic 
gain has been, is still, and will continue to be the ultimate objective of U.S. foreign policy. 
Williams explains,  
Taken seriously, a commitment to the principle of self-determination means a policy 
of standing aside for peoples to make their own choices, economic as well as 
political and cultural.  It is based on a willingness to live and let live- a broad 
tolerance for peoples’ preferences and a willingness, if the opportunity is offered, to 
help them achieve their own goals and in their own fashion.  It is the philosophy of 
an integrated personality, and it might be defined as the foreign policy of a mature 
society.  Though it avowed this principle, the actions of America in the realm of 
foreign affairs did not follow this pattern.  Hence it was not surprising, as Wilson’s 
actions became apparent, that many peoples of the world felt misled by Wilson’s 
slogans about self-determination.  It was one thing to shape one’s own culture, but 
quite another to be pushed aside while others haggled over ethnic statistics and 
then drew lines on a map.31 
 
Anne R. Pierce agrees with William’s interpretation of Wilsonian self-determination 
as an anti-colonial concept, but also adds that Wilson, in his fervent advocacy for the 
principle of self-determination,  himself paved the way for a later reconceptualization of the 
term in domestic and international politics by implying a broader application of the 
principle.  She argues that the distinction between principle and practice for Wilson, as well 
as his vague and varied conceptualizations of the terms in public speech, contributed to 
later confusion about the meaning of the term.  Pierce explains,  
A close look at Wilson’s use of the term “self-determination” reveals that it was used 
in three senses: to mean the right of nations to determine their own destinies free 
from foreign control; to mean the right of individuals to determine their own form of 
government (in this case self-determination being synonymous with government by 
consent); and to mean the right of certain ethnic or racial groups to determine their 
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own destiny be freeing themselves from allegiance to empires and creating new 
governments based on their unique historic and cultural claims.32 
 
Pierce also avers that the Wilsonian idea, ambiguous as it may have been, of self-
determination after WWI, was later espoused by President Harry Truman after WWII. 
Truman claimed that based on the principle of self-determination the United States would 
not interfere with the internal politics of sovereign states, while simultaneously claiming 
that the United States reserved the right to interfere if necessary.33 Truman’s nebulous 
statements indicate the conscious and deliberate differentiation between principle and 
application, as well as between intent and practice, which began in the United States 
shortly after the reintroduction of the principle of self-determination in contemporary U.S. 
politics.  The Wilsonian perspective on the principle of self-determination, as the 
international community’s respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity rather than rights 
of peoples in general, has come to be known in academia as “external self-
determination.”34 
Since the early to mid-twentieth century, the idea of self-determination has evolved 
on a global scale, in many cases with the petitioners playing on the United States’ loyalty, 
however genuine or superficial, to the notion.  After World War II, the Wilsonian vision, 
which conceptualized self-determination as a phenomenon where external influence is 
withheld with regards to government and governance within the borders of another 
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sovereign state, began to be reinterpreted. This new take on self-determination emphasized 
the right of ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural groups within a state to self-rule, 
whether within the framework of existing states or in terms of full independence, regardless 
of existing borders and sovereign governments.  
According to the scholarly literature, this reconceptualization of self-determination 
came with the advent of the United Nations in 1945.  Wilson had attempted to include a 
clause on self-determination in the League of Nations charter, but as it was subject to 
multiple revisions, this clause was ultimately eliminated from the document because several 
European powers expressed marked interest in maintaining mandates and protectorates 
following the war.35   
Article I of the United Nations Charter states, “The purposes of the United Nations 
are…to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to 
strengthen universal peace…”36  Corntassel and Primeau contend that the vague wording of 
this clause although in the leading text of the Charter, although presumably intentional, has 
opened the door for the reinterpretation of self-determination as empowerment of 
minorities, indigenous populations, and subjugated peoples within the state to pursue 
autonomy or even secession.  These authors explain,  
The extension of the right of self-determination…has been vociferously resisted by 
the existing members of the modern state system…The UN Charter explicitly states 
that all ‘peoples’ are accorded the right to self-determination.  Increasingly 
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groups…are seeking greater autonomy within their host states, but not necessarily 
self-determination as it is understood by international law.37  
 
The use of the term “peoples” presents some quite obvious challenges when 
defining and attempting to universalize policy toward claims of self-determination.  Most 
notably, as outlined by Rupert Emerson: How is that particular term defined? Does it apply 
to majorities and minorities equally? Are claims on self-determination elastic or reversible? 
What are the appropriate legal means and national or international fora which can be 
utilized by these movements, and what ultimately qualifies “peoples” to make such 
claims?38 Therefore, since 1945 there has been no progress toward international consensus 
on any concrete elucidation of the Article I of the Charter. 
Only a few years later, the principle of self-determination appeared once again in 
another important United Nations document.  Article 15 of the United Nations Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 states that “1) Everyone has the right to a nationality, 
and 2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change 
his nationality.”39  Even still, these documents either refer to self-determination as a 
principle, or declare certain component rights of self-determination without actually using 
the term. These clauses establish that no one should be made to forego his or her 
nationality. However, there is no clarification with regards to how this will be guaranteed, 
whether in the form of autonomy for national groups, or statehood, or any other 
manifestation of national expression within the modern state system.   
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In the latter part of the twentieth century, the notion of self-determination began to 
be presented as a right rather than simply a principle in international legal texts.  The 
United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1976 is one of the first 
international documents that upholds self-determination as a right.  Article 1 declares that, 
“All peoples have the right of self-determination.  By virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development.”40  Similarly, Article 1 of the United Nations International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights of 1976 states that, “All peoples have the right of self-
determination.  By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”41 The inclusion of self-
determination as a right, quite obviously, complicated any notion of legality with regard to 
the various degrees of claims on self-determination, and also other states’ ability to pass 
policy toward them. 
Carley concurs with Corntassel, Primeau, and Emerson when she explains that the 
glaring problem accompanying the inclusion of self-determination in international 
documents is that there are no criteria explaining which groups are allowed to claim self-
determination.  She says, “Since the 1970s there has been a move to combine the ideas of 
minority rights and decolonization, and the result has been a tendency on the part of some 
advocates to define the self-determination as conferring the right to independent 
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statehood on every distinctive group.”42  In the latter half of the twentieth century, many 
subnational groups have co-opted this new definition of self-determination in seeking 
autonomy or secession.  Many national-self determination movements have invoked the 
clause from Article I of the UN charter as an indication of not only their right to be included 
in government processes in their home states, but also their right to autonomy or 
independence. These include the Quebecois, Basque, Chechens, Tamils, Kurds, Turkish 
Cypriots, Tibetans, Palestinians and Kosovars, just to name a few.  
This brand of self-determination has come to be known as “internal self-
determination.”43 However, internal self-determination, as it is equated with secession, 
presents another legalistic argument with members of institutions of international law, 
namely the United Nations.  As Halim Moris explains, the United Nations Charter, while 
introducing the notion of self-determination to international law, also provides for the 
maintenance of territorial integrity.44  The text itself from Article 2 of the United Nations 
Charter establishes that, “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, 
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”45  Therein 
lies another contemporary complication associated with making policy toward self-
determination movements, for host states in which they exist as well as state participants in 
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international organizations which are reacting to these groups in the interest of aiding allies 
in their internal politics or in the interest of global stability on a broader scale. 
This phenomenon of states invoking self-determination as equivalent to autonomy 
or independence, is reminiscent of the varied modernist theories on nationalism.  
Modernist author Benedict Anderson would argue that these nations are not essential, but 
rather, have been created by the propagation of literature in vernacular, and the existence 
of and their situation within the (oppressive) other.  This compliments Ernest Gellner’s idea 
that “Nationalism is primarily a political principle that holds that the political and the 
national unit should be congruent."46  Both Anderson and Gellner recognize nationalism as 
relatively recent phenomena, and one in which there is no limit to which ethnic, cultural, 
linguistic, social, and political fractionalization can occur, depending on how successful 
groups are in encouraging people to identify with any certain level of the many identities 
and associations they espouse and claiming statehood based on this level of identity.  
However, debates remain: does nationalism necessarily translate to self-determination, and 
does self-determination necessarily translate to autonomy or independence? 
The incongruent views on what self-determination actually means to the parties 
involved presents another facet of the debate in the scholarly literature.  While ethnic, 
religious, linguistic, and cultural groups within sovereign states are invoking self-
determination as equivalent to secession or statehood, the sovereign states in which these 
movements exist continue to identify with the initial conceptualization which involves the 
                                                          
46 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism.  (Ithaca: Cornell, 1983), 1 
23 
 
right of a state to govern without external interference and upholds the territorial integrity 
of an existing state.   As Falk explains,  
What makes self-determination so difficult to clarify is that its exercise involves a 
clash of fundamental world order principles.  On one side is the basic geopolitical 
norm that the existing array of states is close to the maximum that can be 
accommodated within existing diplomatic frameworks.  On the other side of self-
determination is the sense that peoples should be treated equally and that since 
some peoples have the benefit of statehood, that others should be entitled to it as 
well.47 
  
Historically, Woodrow Wilson is credited with the introduction of the concept of 
self-determination into America’s public discourse. Since his “Fourteen Points” speech in 
the wake of World War I, the debate has endured, and become one of the most contentious 
issues in public and academic fora with regards to United States foreign policy. 
Contemporary United States Foreign Policy toward Self-Determination Movements 
Given the evolution of the idea of self-determination in political discourse of the 
United States, the debate for scholars is not only how groups seeking self-determination 
use the term, but also in whether or not this self-determination will serve to fulfill the goals 
of the groups in question, or if this brand of self-determination movements will essentially 
undermine the interests of all parties involved.  Etzioni, echoing Benedict Anderson, argues 
that “(i)t is impossible to sustain the notion that every ethnic group can find its expression 
in a full blown nation-state, fly its flag at the United Nations, and have its ambassadors 
accredited by other nation states; the process of ethnic separation and the breakdown of 
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existing states will never be exhausted.”48 If that is the scenario expected by those vying for 
self-determination as well as those protecting their state from secession (both claiming the 
same international legal documents) how should countries like the United States, which are 
in a unique position to be able to uphold either conceptualization, react? 
Whether or not the United States should enact policy encouraging a federal 
solution, regional autonomy, or independence for a self-determination movement is an 
interesting niche in the scholarly debate.  Although the United States consistently presumes 
to advocate self-determination, the application of the concept, as well as U.S. advocacy of 
certain solutions, is decidedly inconsistent.  Etzioni prescribes for U.S. foreign policy exactly 
what policy makers have chosen as the solution to issues that arise as a result of claims to 
self-determination.  He explains,  
The call for self-determination should no longer elicit such moral support.  [The 
United States] should withhold political and moral support unless the movement 
faces one of truly exceptional situations in which self-determination will enhance 
democracy rather than retard it.  Generally, people who see themselves as 
oppressed put great value on the moral support of others…Governments that face 
ethnic challenges, like Canada, should be urged to provide more local autonomy and 
more democratic federalism in order to prevent dissolution.49 
 
Levy and Young also posit that devolution of power without official autonomous status, in 
hopes of enfranchising these groups within the current political schema, is the solution to 
questions of self determination.  As Levy explains, “Young saw nothing to be gained by just 
replicating the state system at smaller and more ethnically homogenous levels.  Rather, she 
aimed to pluralize states domestically, and to soften the hard boundaries among them 
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internationally.  Ultimately her vision of appropriate shared governance, subsidiarity, and 
self government without sovereignty was meant to extend from the local to the global 
level.”50 
Michael Ignatieff expands this notion of devolution in that they claim that self-
determination should be upheld according to the regime type of the sovereign state in 
question.  He explains, “Where a state is democratic, secessionist demands for self-
determination should be contained within the framework of that state wherever possible; 
but where a state is not democratic, where it opposes all devolution to minorities and 
denies them protection of their educational, linguistic, and cultural rights, secession and 
independence become inevitable.”51  
  In contrast to Etzioni, Young, Levy, and Ignatieff’s proposed solution of regional 
autonomy within sovereign states, as a foreign policy goal of the United States with regard 
to self-determination movements, Bakke and Wibbels argue, that federal solutions to 
alleviate self-determination only amplify perceived differences within the polity and 
exacerbate power struggles between groups by making ideological, cultural, linguistic, 
ethnic, or religious differences also a territorial concern.  They explain, 
While inequality might become an important political issue in a unitary system, it is 
unlikely to have particular geographic salience since geographic units have no formal 
input into the policy process.  In contrast to unitary systems, federalism is built on 
the premise of providing voice to geographically concentrated issues.  Thus, in a 
federation, the issue of inequality is likely to be politicized in a uniquely geographic 
manner.52 
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Scholars agree that non-response, although a popular method of addressing claims 
to self-determination, is no longer an option for the United States or any relatively powerful 
signatory to the United Nations and other international organizations.  For a country in the 
international community as influential as the United States is to ignore claims to self-
determination can undermine its foreign policy goals in other areas.  Patricia Carley 
explains,  
Because the issue [of self-determination] is so complex and potentially explosive, 
the response of the international community has frequently been to sidestep it.  
However, this non-response is becoming increasingly untenable as the 
inconsistencies in the present system become more obvious.  As a greater number 
of national groups demand some level of recognition, the international community 
finds itself without concrete principles with which to respond.53 
  
With regard to United States foreign policy to claims of self-determination, 
specifically claims that link self-determination as presented in international documents to 
claims for autonomy or secession, the recent trend, in absence of non-response, has been 
an inconsistent application of policy.  Michael Hirsh identifies this as a consistent 
contribution to problems in United States foreign policy. He explains,  
The biggest threat to stability in other parts of the world was once Tyranny, but 
today is more often Wilsonian self-determination…In the global echo chamber, we 
are finding, these movements tend to study and cite each other as precedents, and 
often invoke Woodrow Wilson’s promises. One of the crowning ironies for U.S. 
policymakers today is that the right we asserted so eloquently for ourselves in the 
opening words of the Declaration of Independence—the right of a people to 
“dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another”—is, in 
practice, no longer something we recognize for other peoples.54 
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In other words, the ad hoc application of U.S. foreign policy is not lost on those who invoke 
self-determination in the internal sense, and many see this inconsistency as U.S. hypocrisy 
in which the United States claims to uphold certain values, as Williams argues, but 
withholds them in practice.    
The examples which will be discussed here are the self-determination oriented 
claims to statehood of Kosovo and Palestine.  The United States rushed to immediately 
diplomatically recognize Kosovo after the former autonomous Serbian province declared 
independence in February 2008.  Conversely, the United States has declined to establish 
formal diplomatic relations with Palestine, much less recognize their claim to independence, 
which dates back to 1988.  This inconsistency in the application of foreign policy and its 
concepts has fueled the debate in the international community regarding American 
hypocrisy and the effects of the Kosovo precedent.  
 United States foreign policy makers have maintained that the case of Kosovo is 
distinct from all of the other contemporary self-determination movements.  They attribute 
Kosovar statehood as the final moment of balkanization in the 1990s breakdown of the 
Yugoslav state.  Critics of this perspective argue that Kosovar statehood occurred eighteen 
years after the beginning of the Balkan Wars, and ten years after the NATO military 
campaign against Serbia in defense of the Kosovar Albanian minority.  These critics of the 
United States reaction contend that if Kosovo were, in fact, a natural part of the 
disintegration of the Yugoslav state, it would have occurred within a much more proximate 
time as the other states’ reconfigurations. 
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Critics of the inconsistent application of policy assert that the absence of hesitation 
in the United States’ recognition of Kosovar statehood has empowered other stateless 
peoples who claim oppression or disenfranchisement within their home states. The logic in 
this line of thought being, if the United States will recognize one unilateral declaration of 
independence, it will have no choice but to recognize many.  Policymakers in the United 
States maintain that there is no precedent because they consider Kosovo, for various 
reasons, as a distinctly different case from any other claim on self-determination.  Walt 
contends that this type of policy application is a source of resentment of the United States 
throughout the world. He argues that “many people in the Arab and Muslim world cannot 
understand why the United State supports self-determination in places such as Eastern 
Europe or the Balkans yet continues to support Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip and maintains close ties with assorted Arab dictatorships.”55  
Many scholars in addition to Walt find it counterproductive to distinguish between 
self-determination movements based on arbitrary criteria, and contend that other 
movements deserve the same considerations.  Walt illustrates in his exegesis on U.S. foreign 
policy, Taming American Power, how inconsistency in the foreign policy of the United States 
can undermine its credibility and primacy explains, “Both European and Arab critics argue 
that U.S. support for Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is inconsistent 
with the basic principle of self-determination…”56 
Many stateless nations around the world have argued that by recognizing the 
independence of Kosovo, the United States has done just that. Immediately following the 
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widespread, albeit not complete, global support of this event, as well as talk of its role as a 
precedent, flooded international news outlets and influenced many countries’ decision not 
to extend diplomatic relations, including Greece, Romania, Spain, Russia, and many others 
who all happen to have domestic self-determination movements.  As Timothy Garton Ash 
explains,    
“Kosovo is a special case,” says its declaration of independence, going on to 
insist…that it is not a precedent.  But the 68 other members of [Unrepresented 
Nations and Peoples Organization] are special cases too.  Kosovo's declaration of 
dependent independence is the least-worst way forward, but don't let us pretend 
that it's not a precedent. Both statements are true: Kosovo is unique, and there will 
be more Kosovos.57   
 
Ash attempts to make his argument, which is not dissimilar to Walt’s, clear that the United 
States, although attempting to justify its inconsistency in policy on self-determination, risks 
further destabilization through this strategy. By making an example of Kosovo, Ash explains 
that the United States sends the message that it is possible for similar movements to 
achieve their objectives, especially for those groups with outstanding grievances against 
their host states, to achieve independence in the contemporary international system. 
 Conversely, Patricia Carley contends that consistency in the application of policy 
should not be the goal of U.S. foreign policy.  She argues that for the United States to 
adhere to rigid criteria when addressing self-determination movements could be potentially 
dangerous, but regardless, is what is expected by many peoples laying claim to self-
determination in the form of autonomy and sovereignty.  Carley explains,  
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The United States may have no choice but to avoid the pronouncement of clear 
doctrines and principles regarding self-determination movements and thereby avoid 
being driven to intervene in conflicts according to rigid principles that certainly do 
not apply in every instance.  The United States should, however, make absolutely 
clear that secession has not been universally recognized as an international right.58 
 
Carley posits that the United States should frame self-determination, in the sense that it 
represents autonomy or independence, as a last resort of foreign policy. 
  In conclusion, the epistemological discussion of self-determination in the academic 
literature largely begins with Woodrow Wilson’s conceptualization of self-determination as 
a state’s right to govern without external influence.  After the world wars, self-
determination was included in international documents as attributed to “peoples” and not 
states, inspiring a redefinition of the idea of self-determination, especially for those seeking 
it, as a right to autonomy or even statehood.  
 This evolution of the definition of self-determination has largely confounded U.S. 
foreign policy, in that the United States, as Williams contends, has always been a vocal 
advocate of self-determination, but only so far as it furthers the interests of the United 
States, and not without reserving the right to apply its policies inconsistently.  
 In the case of Kosovo, the United States, as did much of the world, jumped to extend 
diplomatic recognition to the former Serbian province upon its declaration of 
independence.  The United States cited special circumstances for Kosovo to warrant 
recognition of its unilateral declaration of independence. However, in the scholarly 
literature as well as news media, concerns of the precedent set by the recognition of 
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Kosovo, especially with regard to such salient and ongoing movements as the movement in 
Palestine, made clear that there are pros and cons regarding the inconsistent application of 
policy to self-determination movements. 
 Some scholars, such as Patricia Carley, argue that inconsistency is the best option for 
United States foreign policy in dealing with the idea of self-determination, because such a 
non-policy gives the United States leeway to pursue its interests. Others, like Walt, who as a 
realist is consistently concerned with the pursuit of national interest in foreign policy, argue 
that such inconsistency undermines American credibility worldwide and can ultimately 
frustrate America’s ability to influence world politics and pursue its own interests. 
 Self-determination movements are gaining traction in a global environment in which 
people are more connected as a result of enhanced international cooperation through the 
advent of instant communication and wide-ranging international organizations, as well as 
the decline of the importance of the state in many aspects of international politics. They are 
a relevant foreign policy problem for the United States in that the U.S. has long upheld the 
principle of self-determination in all its vague glory, and to deny it to other peoples in its 
generation of foreign policy is to project an image of hypocrisy and undermine its 
credibility. The other side of the argument is that if the United States lends aid to one self-
determination movement in pursuit of autonomy or sovereignty, it is expected to do so for 
all active self-determination movements, which, as a result, undermines the stability of the 
state system and the territorial integrity of existing states.  
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Chapter II: Common Assumptions about Kosovo, Palestine, and United States Foreign Policy 
  
While formulating a research angle for this project, I discussed ideas and topics with 
academics and non-academics alike to try and locate the most effective angle at which to 
direct my research. The difficulty was to remain  conscious of the challenges presented by 
these two cases with regards to somewhat widely held conventional wisdom, however 
false, that makes it easy for most people (leadership and lay, alike) to rationalize varying 
treatment of Kosovo and Palestine.  
A certain non-academic associate of mine said, upon hearing my research ideas, 
“Oh, it’s simple to see why the United States has treated Palestine and Kosovo differently. 
One is Muslim and the other is not. One has al Qaeda and the other does not.” Although 
this reinforced my belief that most people have fundamentally false preconceptions about 
both of these nations and their politics, I kindly explained to my associate that Kosovo and 
Palestine are both predominantly Muslim and that neither of these places have a marked al 
Qaeda presence.  Upon my rebuff of this person’s unsubstantiated statements about the 
religious and political makeup of the two territories, he followed it up with a third, 
regarding ethnicity: “Well, Eastern Europeans look more like us.”  
I assume that many reactions to the thesis of this paper will, at first glance, not be 
unlike my associate’s.  It is my first goal in this exercise to illustrate how the self-
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determination efforts in Kosovo and Palestine, in spite of their disparate treatment by the 
United States, have not been overwhelmingly different with regard to religion, ethnicity, or 
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politics. They have, in fact both been marked by internally and externally oriented 
territorial disputes, two-sided ethnic conflict and political violence, and religious 
differences.  
Territorial Claims 
 Kosovars and Serbs, as well as Palestinians and Israelis, have clearly outlined 
territorial claims in their respective geographical locations. Both sides of both cases can 
relate their claim to the disputed territories to centuries- or even millennia-old documents, 
histories, art, traditions, and culture.  
Kosovo as it exists now is a nascent country located in the Balkan region of Eastern 
Europe, half-surrounded on the north by the present-day Serbia, and bordering Albania and 
Macedonia on the south. Serbs and Kosovar Albanians alike contend that each has the more 
legitimate claim to the territory. Kosovars hold the belief that  
their nation is the oldest nation in the Balkans, directly descended from the ancient 
Dardanians…who had allegedly inhabited most of the Western Balkans for many 
centuries before the arrival of Slavic ‘interlopers’ on the scene during the 7th century 
AD. On the other hand, Serbian Orthodox Christians and nationalists regularly refer 
to Kosova as ‘the cradle of the Serb nation. A long tradition of melodramatic Serbian 
epic poetry, folksong, and religious art has celebrated Kosova as a Serbian ‘spiritual 
homeland’ within which medieval Serbian kings and princes built great Orthodox 
Christian churches and monasteries, fought famous battles for their faith and for 
their kith and kin, and were buried. Kosova is regularly referred to as the ‘crucible of 
Serbdom,’ and the Serbian and the Serbian Orthodox Church as well as the Serbian 
epic songs and poetry kept this notion of ‘Serbdom’ alive through more than four 
centuries of ottoman rule (1455-1912) and subsequently.59  
 
After centuries as a part of the Ottoman Empire, the Kingdom of Serbia laid claim to 
the territory in 1912. Serbia, and consequently Kosovo, were both eventually absorbed into 
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the area that would be known as Yugoslavia from 1929 until 1991.60 Thus, after the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, both Serbs and Kosovar Albanians jumped at 
the chance to lay claim to the territory based on its perceived historical significance to both 
groups.  
Similarly, present day Israel and Palestine were once inhabited by ancient peoples 
with arguable links to modern descendents, and the territory also spent a significant 
amount of time under the rule of the Ottoman Empire. Arab nationalism was encouraged by 
France and Great Britain in order to defeat the Ottoman Turks, and upon said defeat, in 
spite of the territorial claims of Arabs, the Balfour Declaration of 1917 imposed the creation 
of a Jewish homeland in Palestine61 Both parties, Muslim Arabs and European Jews, 
asserted their right to the land based on historical evidence as referenced in their 
respective religious texts. However as Gregory Harms and Todd M. Ferry explain in The 
Israel-Palestine Conflict: A Basic Introduction,  
The history of the region goes back many thousands of years. Over that time, many 
peoples have populated the land of Palestine – not Just the Arabs and Jews – and 
they lived together, intermixed, intermarried, merged, and grew apart… Though 
Palestinians and Jews see themselves as different now, there is a remarkable 
congruence to their histories that should be remembered when considering the 
modern conflict and both peoples’ claims to the land of Palestine.62 
 
Therein exists one of the most obvious similarities between the efforts for self-
determination in Kosovo and in Palestine. Both parties involved lay historical claims to the 
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territory in question, based on a history in which both of these territories have changed 
hands on multiple occasions, yielding historical significance for both parties in each case. 
Ethnicity 
 Secondly, in both cases, there has been two-sided violent ethnic conflict, and, 
contrary to popular belief, this conflict has been a relatively recent development. The 
conflict between Serbs and Kosovar Albanians, as we know it, began in the 1990s with the 
Yugoslav Wars and the conflict between Arabs and Jews in Palestine, as we know it, began 
in 1947-48 with the creation of Israel as a state. 
As Yugoslavia began to disintegrate in the early 1990s, the creation of new nations 
based on ethnic identity and territorial claims, often referred to in scholarly literature as 
Balkanization, occurred. Ethnic Albanians in the Kosovo province of Serbia became vocal 
about their desires to be included in this trend of self-determination; however, ethnic Serbs 
were also a constituent part of the province. It is at this point that ethnic Albanians and 
ethnic Serbs began to engage in renewed violent conflict. On one side, Kosovars protesting 
Serbian rule and demanding autonomy for a territory and a people that, to them, has a 
clearly different identity and agenda than the governing Serbs. On the other, Serbs 
maintaining that Kosovo is a vital part of Serbia’s territorial integrity and that Serbia has an 
historical right to govern the province of Kosovo and its peoples.  
Though the violence was two-sided, the most outstanding illustration of it became 
the attempt by Serbia to ethnically cleanse Albanians from the province of Kosovo 
culminating in an unprecedented bombing campaign by NATO in Serbia and Montenegro 
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between March and June of 199963 Tim Judah summarizes, “By the time the bombing had 
ended, the UNHCR reported that 848,100 Albanians had fled [Kosovo]…Including the 
hundreds of thousands displaced within Kosovo, some 1.45 million Kosovo Albanians were 
displaced.”64  
 In his book, The New Military Humanism: Lessons From Kosovo, author Noam 
Chomsky explains that the hundreds of thousands of refugees of the ethnic cleansing and 
subsequent NATO bombing in Kosovo in 1999 is, “all too familiar…The UNHCR totals at the 
war’s end are about the same as the number of Palestinians who fled or were expelled in 
1948, another policy that is very much alive today. In that case, refugees number about 
750,000, 85 percent of the population, with over 400 villages leveled, and ample 
violence.”65   
 In his book, The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine, Ilan Pappe echoes Chomsky’s 
comparison of the plights of Kosovo and Palestine against ethnic violence as he explores the 
systematic expulsion of Arabs from the region since 1948 as an example of ethnic cleansing 
that has not conventionally been seen or studied as such. Pappe explains that Plan Dalet, or 
part D of a larger Zionist agenda to achieve a Jewish homeland apart from the British 
Mandate system, “was first based on retaliation against Palestinian attacks in February 
1947, but and it transformed into an initiative to ethnically cleanse the country as a whole 
in 1948.”66  
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Not only has ethnic cleansing marked both of these conflicts, but so has the creation 
of a political advocacy group, often with an armed contingent which is seen as an outlaw or 
terrorist group, to fight for the interests of Palestine and Kosovo. In both of these cases, 
these groups, although characterized at points by violent acts, have endured to produce 
political parties, esteemed leaders, diplomats, legislative bodies, and many other trappings 
of a state government. 
“Among the Palestinians, the seeds of rebellion were sown with the formation of the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), as well as a smaller, more militant group called al-
Fatah, the leaders of which included a young nationalist named Yasser Arafat.”67 Arafat 
would lead the PLO for 40 years until his death in 2004, with his leadership characterized 
simultaneously by violence and terror, as well manifest interest in diplomacy and peace all 
in the name of Palestinian statehood.68 
The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) can be seen as a similar organization to the 
Palestine Liberation Organization. The KLA was founded in 1993, and like the PLO, was 
characterized by many in the international community as an organization bent on violence 
and terrorism, an organization that would stop at nothing to achieve its objectives. Also like 
the PLO, the KLA evolved into a formidable political force in the Kosovar self-determination 
movement and yielded the long-time leadership of Hashim Thaçi, “wartime political head of 
the KLA and the prime minister of Kosovo when it declared independence.”69 
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Both the PLO and the KLA were also characterized by factionalization, in which the 
organizations branched into militant and political arms, Fatah being the militant associate of 
the PLO, and the KLA being the militant associate of the Popular Movement for Kosova.70 In 
sum, both the Kosovar and the Palestinian bids for statehood have centered on 
organizations in which the lines have been blurred between political advocacy, freedom 
fighting, and terrorist activity. However, these groups have begotten the leadership and the 
institutions of governance that characterize the movements in their present form. 
Religion 
Thirdly, conventional wisdom credits religious divisions as a major cause for both the 
Kosovar and the Palestinian conflicts; however, an inexpert opinion might attribute the 
presence of Islam in both cases as the source of tension. However, it is equally plausible 
that these conflicts are just as likely fueled by the zeal with which Serbian Orthodox 
Christians and Israeli Jews practice and adhere to their respective religions.  
 It is a fact that the population of Kosovo is predominantly Albanian Muslim, 
whereas the rest of Serbia and much of the Balkans is inhabited by Serbian (Eastern) 
Orthodox Christians. While Albanian Muslim Kosovars make no claims to the territory based 
on religion, one of Serbia’s chief claims to the territory is that Kosovo is a central part of the 
Eastern Orthodox religion in Serbia and the Balkans. Serbs often cite the number of Eastern 
Orthodox churches and monasteries that have characterized the Kosovo region for 
centuries as a testament to Serbia’s right to claim Kosovo as an integral part of the 
territorial integrity of Serbia. 
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 As Bideleux and Jeffries explain,  
In recent times, Serbian nationalists… have tended to claim (and may even believe) 
that these illustrious monastic complexes and the relics of those who founded them 
or died defending them have established ‘eternally sanctified’ Serbian claims to 
these lands, even though they are now overwhelmingly inhabited by Muslim 
Kosovars – in much the same way that some Zionist zealots believe that their ‘Holy 
Places’ and all the Jews that have suffered on account of their special identity and 
faith have established eternal Jewish rights to ‘the Holy Lands’ which for over 1,300 
years have been mainly inhabited by Arabs. 71 
 
Israel is, by design, a Jewish state, but it was created on territory inhabited 
predominantly by Muslims, not to mention that the territory has scriptural significance to 
both religions. That said, although religion plays a role, it is difficult to distinguish religiously 
motivated conflict from ethnically motivated conflict when both variables are present and 
working simultaneously. As Harms and Ferry so succinctly state,  
First, The Palestine-Israel conflict is not thousands of years old. There is certainly no 
‘blood-feud’ between Arabs and Jews dating back to the sons of Abraham. Secondly, 
the variety of cultures and the dramatic degree to which cultures have changed over 
time should also now be apparent. From the Canaanites to the Romans, these are 
the roots of the ancient Palestinian and Jewish culture. Thirdly, Jews, the 
descendents of the ancient Israelites, are as such also descendents of the ancients 
Canaanites, the people of Canaan, also modern Palestine. And indeed, by one name 
or another, the Jews have populated the land for thousands of years…The native 
Palestinians of today are also descendents of the ancient Canaanites.72 
 
In sum, ethnic and religious divisions as conflict-inducing should, in both cases, be 
seen as a relatively recent development, not as a given. Religious differences are but one of 
the potential causes of conflict in both Kosovo and Palestine, but the peoples of these two 
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territories have not been warring for centuries over religious differences, contrary to 
popular conceptions of the conflicts. 
Autonomy 
 Both Palestinians and Kosovars, during their efforts toward independence, have 
attained some degree of autonomy within their host states. For Kosovo, autonomy has been 
a gradual struggle. Kosovo agreed in 1943-44 to join the struggle against German 
occupation in return for its eventual unification with Albania. However, the territory was 
annexed to Serbia in 1945 as an “autonomous region,” and in 1966 became an 
“autonomous province.” These are terms which meant relatively little at the time for 
Kosovo and the other Yugoslav republics, provinces, and territories, as they were not only 
responsible for themselves, but for the Yugoslav whole.73  Tim Judah explains that in 1974 
Kosovo’s autonomy swelled,  
when a new Yugoslav constitution redefined Kosovo’s place within the country. 
Kosovo remained part of Serbia but was almost a full federal entity: It had its own 
national bank, parliament, government, and police, and thanks to increasing 
Albanianization and greater numbers of qualified Albanians now able to do the jobs, 
Albanians were more or less in full control of Kosovo. Apart from its own assemble, 
its deputies sat in both the Yugoslav federal parliament and the Serbian one.74 
 
During the outbreak of war in Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, Kosovo’s parliament voted to 
make Kosovo a republic on par with Serbia, Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia Montenegro, and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. This vote was rejected by the Serbs and the gesture was lost in the 
scuffle of the Yugoslav wars, where Serbia would attempt to exert firmer control of Kosovo, 
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culminating in the 1999 ethnic cleansing campaign against Kosovar Albanians, and again in 
the Kosovar Declaration of Independence in 2008.75 
 Similarly, autonomy for Palestine has been a struggle since the creation of the Israeli 
state in 1948. Palestinians have since sought political, economic, and social autonomy at 
minimum, and independence at most for the predominantly Palestinian territories of the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In the years that followed Israel’s founding, Jewish 
settlements began to crop up in the predominantly Israeli territories, heightening tensions 
and drawing international notice. The Palestinian Liberation Organization was founded in 
1964 as a political organization, with the more militant al-Fatah as its armed associate, with 
the clear political objectives of autonomy and independence from Israel. In 1974, the leader 
of the 10-year-old PLO was invited to speak before the United Nations General Assembly. As 
Harms and Ferry describe: 
A little over a week after Arafat’s address, the General Assembly passed two 
resolutions, 3236 and 3237. The first affirmed the Palestinian “right to self-
determination without external interference” and “the right to national 
independence and sovereignty”…The second resolution conferred “observer status” 
(within the UN) upon the PLO.76 
 
This fueled, and to some extent, legitimized the Palestinian’s desire for autonomy, but also 
infuriated Israeli Jews, sparking a period of heightened violence in the region, leading to the 
Intifada, or uprising, by Palestinians against Israelis that would beget the Palestinian 
Declaration of Independence in 1988.  
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Independence 
Finally, both Kosovo and Palestine have declared independence from the nation 
states which claim them: Serbia and Israel, respectively. Palestine’s Declaration of 
Independence came following the initial violence of the First Intifada on November 15, 
1988. Since then, 94 countries have recognized the statehood of Palestine, while 11 others 
have granted some form of diplomatic consideration.77 The United States has, however, 
refused diplomatic recognition of Palestine in order to pursue the so-called “peace 
process,” where vagaries and non-binding formalities are the mode.  
 Conversely, Kosovo’s declaration of independence occurred on February 17, 2008, 
and within only one year, 62 countries have recognized Kosovo as a sovereign nation.78 One 
of those 62 is the United States, which promptly recognized Kosovo’s independence the day 
following the declaration. Some scholars infer that United States officials went so far as to 
assist Kosovo in composing its Declaration of Independence.79  
Both declarations have been unilateral, that is, not a concerted effort by many states 
within the framework of the United Nations. The United Nations is the organization which 
most countries consider to be the authority on rule of law proceedings in the international 
community, and therefore, a necessary part of the process of the creation of any new state. 
Also, both declarations have, to some extent, been a result of a combination of territorial 
disputes, religious cleavages, violent conflict, and a general sentiment of 
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disenfranchisement among the petitioning groups. Both Declarations of Independence were 
also spoken by alleged international terrorists turned political pioneers of each of these 
movements: Yasser Arafat for the PLO (PNA and Fatah) and Hashim Thaçi for the KLA. 
All of the characteristics of the Kosovo and Palestine self-determination movements 
discussed in this chapter serve to illustrate the claim that these movements have been 
fundamentally alike. They exhibit the same elements of territorial claims, ethnic conflict, 
religious tension, a degree of autonomy within the existing state, and a formal and 
unilateral declaration of independence. The fact remains that these movements have 
received immensely disparate consideration from the United States; the remaining task of 
this exercise is to discover why.  
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Part III: Social Constructivist Theory, Kosovo, and Palestine 
It is often assumed by some scholars and most policymakers that states conduct 
foreign policy based on national interests that are endemic to all nations, such as survival 
and security.  Social constructivist theory, which will be used as the theoretical touchstone 
for this exercise, posits that states do not possess these inherent interests, but that 
interests arise as a result of the relational interaction between parties. To clarify, social 
constructivism does not deny that interests in relative capability and security dominate the 
international political climate, especially with regard to the United States. However, social 
constructivism would posit that ultimately these interests are a social construction, and 
theoretically, they vary among state relations depending on the nature of the relationship 
between the states in question. 
In “Anarchy Is What States Make of It,” social constructivist scholar Alexander 
Wendt explains that “a fundamental principle of constructivist social theory is that people 
act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of meanings that the objects have 
for them. States act differently towards enemies than they do toward friends because 
enemies are threatening and friends are not.”80  
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Wendt contends that relationships among states and international entities arise out 
of the parties’ shared knowledge of one another. He explains that the nature of these 
relationships can be Hobbesian, or characterized by enmity; Lockean, or characterized by 
competition; or Kantian, characterized by amity.81 He also explains that these relationships 
can be motivated by coercion, interest, or legitimacy.82 This 3x3 matrix of international 
relations presents nine different modes of international relations, which can vary depending 
on the states involved. In this chapter I argue that the United States has cultivated a Kantian 
relationship of legitimacy with Kosovo against conventional wisdom because of its unusually 
high level of support for the United States and its geopolitical position. Conversely, while 
the United States’ relationship with Palestine is also Kantian, in that the United States 
would not necessarily be an enemy or a competitor of Palestine, it is also interest-based, in 
that the United States is more concerned about its own stake in the Palestine-Israel conflict 
than the interests of Palestine, the region, or the larger international implications. 
Wendt’s social constructivist theory will be central to explaining the United States’ 
foreign policy toward Kosovo and Palestine and why these analogous movements have 
received dissimilar treatment.  Just as I expounded above on the ways in which the 
movements in Kosovo and Palestine posses the same elements, I will now illustrate the 
United States’ reaction to these movements, not because they are fundamentally different 
from one another, but because policy makers in the United States, and consequently, the 
United States as a unitary actor have perceived them as fundamentally different from one 
another and acted upon them based on these perceptions. This variance among state 
                                                          
81 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Relation,. (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1999), 247. 
82 Ibid, 286. 
47 
 
relations is a prime example of the constructed nature of foreign policy objectives in the 
international relations of states.  
I will also establish how the United States and its policymakers have consistently 
vocalized the message of the uniqueness of Kosovo as a justification for U.S. support for the 
Balkan nation while withholding support for other self-determination movements. I have 
argued above that Kosovo is, by and large, not unique vis-á-vis Palestine. However, 
policymakers in the United States have, in propagating this as the reason for its recognition 
as a state, also inadvertently vocalized two other, perhaps more likely reasons that the two 
movements have been treated differently. The first is the perception among policymakers 
in the United States that the people of Kosovo are overwhelmingly pro-American. The 
second is the enduring Cold-War mentality manifested in the United States’ response to the 
existence of a relatively powerful, increasingly wealthy, and potentially threatening regional 
power in Russia.  
The Rhetoric 
Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, U.S. Department of State, 
testified before the U.S. House Foreign Affairs in a hearing in April 2007 on the future of 
Kosovo that “We believe the people have a right. We Americans believe the people have a 
right to control their own destiny. I don’t distance myself so much from every other group 
in the world as I know that you must in order to make sure that we have stability in the 
world. I am somewhat sympathetic to other people who are seeking their independence.”83 
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Juxtaposed with the first chapter’s explanation of the history of the United States’ attitude 
toward self-determination, as well as the illustration of how the self-determination 
movements in Kosovo and Palestine are, in essence, alike, the double standard in the above 
statement is apparent. The United States clearly does not believe in the right of all people 
to control their own destiny. Rather, the United States unwaveringly believes in the right of 
some people to control some of their destiny some of the time.  
As mentioned in the literature review portion of this exercise, since the relative 
success of Kosovo’s declaration of independence in February 2008, the United States, in its 
subsequent policy decisions, has not been able to escape the casual comparison of Kosovo 
with other self-determination movements within sovereign states. The United States, 
however, has consistently defended its recognition of the embryonic Balkan state by 
maintaining that Kosovo is fundamentally different from all other existing self-
determination movements, an argument which I have discussed and disproven in the 
preceding chapter.  
In announcing the United States’ recognition of the independence of Kosovo, former 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice made clear that United States  and its leadership would 
have a unified  policy that would stress Kosovo an exceptional case that should, under no 
circumstances, be emulated. United States Congressman Howard Berman, chairman of the 
House Foreign Relations Committee, expressed in a statement following the United States’ 
recognition of Kosovo as a sovereign and independent nation:   
Questions have been raised in some sectors of the international community about 
the legality and legitimacy of Kosovo’s declaration of independence, as well as 
America’s recognition of the new country. I support the position of the 
Administration and of our leading European allies that the situation of Kosovo is 
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unique, given the history of ethnic cleansing, as well as the unprecedented level of 
involvement by the United Nations and NATO.84 
 
In this statement, Berman gives two reasons for the United States’ support of 
Kosovar independence, the first being that Kosovar Albanians were subject to ethnic 
cleansing campaigns by the Serbian population. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines 
ethnic cleansing as “the expulsion, imprisonment, or killing of an ethnic minority in order to 
achieve ethnic homogeneity.” The Cambridge Dictionary characterizes ethnic cleansing as 
“the organized attempt by one racial or political group to completely remove from a 
country or area anyone who belongs to another particular racial group, using violence and 
often murder to achieve this.” The Macmillan Dictionary simply states that ethnic cleansing 
is “the use of violence to force people from a particular ethnic group to leave an area.” 
 As discussed above, this brand of subjugation and violence is not characteristic only 
of the conflict between Serbs and Kosovars in Kosovo’s quest for independence. 
Palestinians in the occupied territories have also been subject to institutionalized violence, 
systematic discrimination, political subjugation, geographic concentration, and armed 
aggression by the Israeli government and armed forces, all in the name of an exclusively 
Jewish state.  
Though this treatment of Palestinians has rarely been referred to outside academia 
as “ethnic cleansing,” with consideration for the definitions above, one could argue that 
Palestinians have also been subject to ethnic cleansing campaigns by their Israeli 
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counterparts. Using dissimilar language to describe the two cases does not make the reality 
any different. As the old adage goes, a rose by any other name would smell as sweet. 
Policymakers of the United States have attributed the uniqueness of Kosovo to occurrence 
of ethnic cleansing, when in reality this is just one more similarity that Kosovo and Palestine 
share. Again, this is a clear example of the constructivist notion that states react not 
objectively and consistently based on input, process, and output, but on perceptions of 
situations, based shared knowledge and on the history of interactions between them.   
 The second reason Congressman Berman gives in his statement for the United 
States’ support of Kosovo’s declaration of independence is the extensive involvement by 
the United Nations and NATO in this specific case.  While it is true that NATO itself has had 
no marked involvement in Palestine, the organization has recently vocalized support for the 
efforts of the United Nations on the issue. As was established in the Istanbul Conference in 
2004, NATO established the official position that:  
Progress towards a just, lasting, and comprehensive settlement of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict should remain a priority for the countries of the region and the 
international community as a whole, and for the success of the security and stability 
objectives of this initiative. Full and speedy implementation of the Quartet Road 
Map is a key element in international efforts to promote a two state solution to the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict in which Israel and Palestine live side by side in peace and 
security.85 
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NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has also expressed that if NATO 
involvement is requested by Israelis and Palestinians upon reaching a final settlement, that 
NATO assistance will be at the disposal of the parties involved.86  
The conflict between Israelis and Palestinians has been a constant on the United 
Nations’ agenda since 1947, when, “faced with escalating violence [between immigrating 
Jews and indigenous Palestinians], the British Government decided, in February 1947, to 
bring the question of Palestine before the new United Nations (est. 1945).”87 This marked 
the beginning of intensive United Nations interest and involvement in the region. A timeline 
of this involvement, as described in greater detail in the UN sanctioned report, “The 
Question of Palestine and the United Nations,” are:  
§ UN involvement in the Israel-Palestine question has included the first special 
session of the General Assembly (1947),  
§ the creation of the United Nations Special Committee On Palestine (1947),  
§ adoption of resolution 181 calling for a creation of two states with economic 
union and international trusteeship of Jerusalem (1947),  
§ presence of the United Nations Truce Supervision organization (1949-
present),  
§ adoption by the Security Council of Resolution 194 granting Palestinian 
refugees the right to return (1948),  
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§ deployment of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 
Refugees for the provision of education, healthcare, and other human rights 
(1950-present),  
§ deployment of the United Nations Emergency Force (1956-1967),  
§ adoption by the Security Council of Resolution 242 calling for the withdrawal 
of Israeli forces from occupied territories as well as an end to violence in the 
region (1967),  
§ adoption by the General Assembly of Resolution 2535 affirming that 
Palestinians’ rights under the UN Charter and the UN Declaration of Human 
Rights were being violated, adoption by the Security Council of resolutions 
338 and 339 calling for peace negotiations and a ceasefire (1973),  
§ provision of a international forum for the Yasser Arafat and the PLO before 
the General Assembly and an invitation to assume observer status in the UN 
for the PLO (1973), 
§  establishment by the General Assembly of the Committee on the Exercise of 
the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People (1975),  
§ implementation of the Program of Assistance to the Palestinian People to 
facilitate economic development (1980),  
§ convention of the International Conference on the Question of Palestine 
(1983),  acknowledgement by the General Assembly of the Palestinian 
declaration of independence in the form of resolution 43/177 (1988),  
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§ establishment of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East 
Peace Process (1994),  
§ granting of additional participatory privileges in the UNO to Palestine in the 
form of General Assembly Resolution 52/250 (1998),  
§ adoption of Security Council Resolution 1397 reiterating the call for an end to 
violence as well as a two-state solution (2002), and 
§ adoption of Security Council Resolution 1515 in support of the “Road Map” 
peace plan contrived collaboratively by the European Union, United States, 
Russia, and the United Nations (2003). 
This brief timeline exemplifies exactly how involved the United Nations has been in 
Palestine, and while the organization has not offered extensive human resources and 
peacekeeping support as it did in Kosovo, one could argue that the level of interest and 
involvement that the United Nations has assumed in Palestine is, to use Chairman Berman’s 
language, “unprecedented.”  
A Likelier Story 
 After Establishing that the policymakers of the United States chant the mantra that 
Kosovo is a special case, a continuance of the breakdown of the former Yugoslavia, and that 
it is bound to and responsible to the international community because of NATO and UN 
involvement, we can now establish to what extent perceptions of and interactions with 
Kosovo have cultivated support for its independence in the United States. The idea that 
Kosovo is not “special,” but is perceived as such is central to our understanding of why it 
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has been addressed much more favorably in United States foreign policy than its Palestinian 
counterpart. Alexander Wendt explains how interstate relations come to be when he says: 
This process of signaling, interpreting, and responding completes a "social act" and 
begins the process of creating intersubjective meanings. It advances the same way. 
The first social act creates expectations on both sides about each other's future 
behavior: potentially mistaken and certainly tentative, but expectations 
nonetheless. Based on this tentative knowledge, ego makes a new gesture, again 
signifying the basis on which it will respond to alter, and again alter responds, adding 
to the pool of knowledge each has about the other, and so on over time. The 
mechanism here is reinforcement; interaction rewards actors for holding certain 
ideas about each other and discourages them from holding others.88  
 
This idea of an interstate repartee in which one state, through incremental 
interaction, identifies the intent of another, is central to the United States formation of 
opinion and policy regarding Kosovo and Palestine. While the rhetoric of United States 
policymakers is that Kosovo is a special case, and therefore, should be treated as such, one 
may detect in the speech of policy makers the idea that the people of Kosovo are 
unabashedly in favor of all things American and that these pro-American sentiments 
warranted, in the minds of policymakers, the United States recognition of Kosovo 
independence.  
Upon the United States’ recognition of Kosovo as independent and sovereign, then 
United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice averred,  
President Bush has responded affirmatively to a request from Kosovo to establish 
diplomatic relations between our two countries. The establishment of these 
relations will reaffirm the special ties of friendship that have linked together the 
people of the United States and Kosovo…As Kosovo today begins its life as an 
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independent state, the United States pledges to continue to be its close friend and 
partner.89   
 
This statement of cooperation goes beyond the language of objective political support to 
the sentimental language of friends and partnership. Consequently, such statements leave 
one wondering what exactly the basis for this friendship is.  
Kosovo defies traditional realist credentials for a likely ally, or to use the less 
utilitarian language of United States leadership, “friend.” Kosovo is a diminutive county with 
regards to geography and population; is not part of any international bloc; is too young to 
have much of an international political agenda beyond independence; it is not quite post-
industrial with agriculture and industry each comprising 20 percent of the economy and 
services comprising the remaining 60 percent; and the struggling economy is evident with 
45 percent unemployment, and 35 percent of the population under the poverty line.90 
These are not the makings of what a realist would typically consider a sound political, 
economic, or military investment, especially not at the expense of relations with other 
much more influential allies. So the question is why is the United States so overtly invested 
in the success of Kosovo as an independent nation? The first reason, quite simply, is that 
with its vociferous praise of the United States, Kosovo has played to America’s egoistic 
streak, and it is being handsomely rewarded. 
The evidence that Kosovar and Albanian people hold the United States in high 
esteem is clear. George W. Bush replaced the celebrated Mother Theresa as the namesake 
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of a street in the capital city of Pristina, Kosovo. Former President Bill Clinton has a 
neighborhood named for him as well as a recently unveiled statue on Bill Clinton Boulevard 
in the capital.91 George W. Bush has appeared on three Albanian postage stamps and lends 
his name to the street that runs in front of the Albanian parliament.92 The Clintons and 
Bushes have, since the late 1990s served as the namesake for many children in Kosovo and 
Albania.93 Many American presidents and politicians have been immensely popular in 
Kosovo and Albania, and the adulation of the United States and its leaders has influenced 
United States policy on the region, even inspiring a sense of moral obligation among United 
States policymakers to the newest Balkan.   
A clear example of this is Congressman Eliot Engel’s statement in the U.S. House 
Foreign Relations Committee hearing on Kosovar Independence. Toeing the popular policy 
line on Kosovo, he asserts:  
I am proud of the role the United States has played, and, of course, the people of 
Kosova are so pro-United States, it is one of the places in the world where chants of 
USA just break out all of the time. When independence was declared, I think we saw 
more American flags in the streets of Pristina than Albanian flags or the new Kosova 
flag. That is the high esteem that the people there hold for the United States, and 
certainly after 1999 and the ethnic cleansing of the former dictator, Milosevic, there 
is no way that Belgrade could have ruled Kosova ever again. So this is the logical 
conclusion… I am absolutely convinced that this is not only the right way to go, the 
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moral way to go, but the correct way to go in terms of doing what is right and in 
doing what is right for stability in the region.94 
  
In the same hearing, many of the committee members echoed Engel’s sentiments, 
referring to the relationship between the United States and Kosovo as one of friends and 
allies. Daniel Fried, the Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs 
for the United States Department of State, added in the same hearing that, “The Kosovo 
population is pro-American, pro-Western, rather secular in outlook, and they look to Europe 
as their future and to the United States as their friend.”95 This further illustrates the idea 
that before Kosovo formally existed as a nation that it was guaranteed to have an amicable 
relationship with the United States. Engel’s statement is a primary example the 
constructivist notion that perceptions of one nation’s politics and attitudes toward another 
can dictate the perceiving nation’s policies, regardless of the greater political implications.  
 On the other hand, the United States has formed no such impression of Palestinian 
attitudes towards the U.S., but there is no such blatant pro-American sentiment among 
Palestinian people or their leadership. The United States has been roundly criticized by 
much of the Arab world for its support of Israel. That being said, one could say that the 
United States’ support of Israel has stemmed from perceptions of pro-American attitudes 
among Israelis.  This support of Israel continues to be one of the most prevalent grievances 
against the U.S. by the militant Palestinian group Hamas, which does not recognize Israel 
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and calls for its destruction in order to achieve a Palestinian state. Hamas, which split with 
the Palestinian Authority, presently possesses de facto control of the Gaza, while the 
Palestinian Authority controls the West Bank.  
However, the United States’ perception of Hamas as representative of the whole of 
politics and governing structures of Palestinians has also led to the lack of diplomatic 
recognition of Palestine by the United States. In other words, policymakers in the United 
States have consistently cited the extremist organization Hamas as the reason there has 
been no progress in achieving statehood for the moderate majority of Palestinians, even 
though Hamas is only a faction in the greater movement in favor of a Palestinian state. 
David Makovsky, the Director of the Project on the Middle East Peace Process for the 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, states, “According to the Palestinian-run 
Jerusalem media communications center polling unit, only 35 percent of Palestinians in 
Gaza believe Hamas’ assertion of victory”96 after the elections for the Palestinian Legislative 
Council in January 2006. The United States’ non-negotiation policy with Hamas, which is 
hostile toward Israel, is not representative of the majority of Palestinians and has stunted 
the facilitation of finding common ground among Palestinians as well as final solution 
processes in the broader scope.  
 The other reason for the disparate treatment of Kosovo that has infiltrated U.S. 
policymakers’ speech relates to the realist concept of the balance of power, or creating 
alliances in order to have the most relative power in an anarchic world system. While 
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Alexander Wendt’s constructivist theory is based on process, on the idea that state interests 
are not inherent but formed through interaction, he does concede to the Realist notion of 
an anarchic world system. Wendt concedes that there is no supreme and binding world 
government, but contradicts the realist notion that anarchy begets a self-help system, 
where each state seeks to maximize its relative power. However, Wendt argues that self-
help as a mode of international relations has dominated because it is the system that states 
have created through their interaction, not because of a self-interested human nature and a 
natural predilection of individuals and states to seek power.97  
For the purposes of this exercise, let us accept the constructivist idea that states do, 
in fact, exist in an anarchical structure, that states have, if purposefully or inadvertently, 
created a competitive and self-help system within the anarchy and that policymakers 
govern states as such instead of overhauling the mode of state interaction. The relative 
geographical position of Kosovo and the United States’ perception of its position is, 
therefore, a revealing piece of the puzzle that explains Kosovo’s special treatment by United 
States foreign policy. Kosovo is located between the European Union, which the United 
States perceives as an ally through many EU members’ participation in the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, and Russia, with which the United States interacts tentatively due to a 
tense recent Cold War history, the vestiges of which continue almost 20 years after the 
disintegration of the USSR. The United States, in various political outlets has suggested its 
support for both Kosovo and Serbia, the latter of which has a history of close ties with 
Russia, in looking to the West for political cues and support.   
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Statements by policymakers in the United States indicate a sort of claim being made 
on the Balkans by the United States on the grounds that the United States has funded, 
staffed, and brokered peace movements in the region. This has effectively landed Kosovo in 
the midst of what United States policymakers treat as an ideological tug of war with Russia. 
In a hearing on the future of Kosovo after the 1999 NATO campaign and before the 
declaration of independence, Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, U.S. 
Department of State explained to the House Foreign Relations Committee that,  
One of the things I think we have to remember is that Russia has had a longstanding 
historical relationship with Serbia going back centuries. Russia and Serbia feel close 
to each other, but I would suggest that the United States has also had a very good 
relationship with Serbia. One of the points we continue to make to the Russians and 
others is who has done the work over the last 8 years? Whose troops have been in 
Kosova? Whose money has gone to support the province? Whose political efforts 
have been most prominent? It has been the United States and the European Union. 
We are the countries that no matter what the Security Council does will have to be 
there to help shoulder the responsibility for the aftermath. We want that aftermath 
to be positive and one of independence and peace rather than one of stalemate, 
which would be produced by a hung jury.98 
 
As indicated by political statements delivered by United States policymakers, old Cold War 
fissures linger in the formation of contemporary U.S. Foreign Policy. Burns’ statement is a 
very clear depiction of an “us-versus-them,” global power-versus-global power attitude 
that, in spite of the discontinuation of the cold war some 20 years ago, continues to seep 
into relations between the United States and the Russian Federation.   
Howard Berman, Chair of the House Foreign Relations Committee in a hearing after 
Kosovar independence, expressed his hope that Serbian voters would  
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indicate strong support for a Serbia that is firmly rooted in the Euro-Atlantic 
community rather than governed by radicals who seek closer ties to Russia. 
Although Russia has presented itself as a good friend to Serbia and has been richly 
rewarded for its support with a 15-percent share of Serbia’s state-owned oil 
company, the Serb people must realize that their future lies to the West and not to 
the East.99  
 
Again, this is another illustration of Cold War attitudes continuing in the minds, mouths, and 
actions of foreign policy makers in the United States.  
 In the case of Palestine, there is no large-scale historical rivalry in the region, nor a 
state that the United States has perceived as a threat in the sense that it could overwhelm 
the United States militarily, economically, or politically. It is this lack of an influential global-
scale power in the region that has created the circumstances in which the United States can 
defer any specific opinion or postpone any direct action on the question of the final solution 
of the Israel-Palestine conflict. Iran is perhaps the most prominent antagonist in the region, 
but the contentious nature of the relationship between Israel and Iran, as well as the United 
States and Iran has caused the United States to support Israel and ascribe to the realist 
notion of balancing, the idea that “my enemy’s enemy is my friend.” 
 These two veins of thought in United States Foreign policy toward Kosovo and 
Palestine belie the idea that U.S. policymakers believe that Kosovo is a unique case among 
self-determination movements and that this is the only reason for recognition by the United 
States. It is clear from the informal public speech of America’s policymakers that there are 
at least two more reasons that Kosovo has been recognized and other movements have not, 
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and that all of these reason have been constructed through interactions with parties that 
are associated with the movements as well as their host nations and their geographical 
neighbors. 
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Part IV: Conclusion 
 The United States has, in theory, long been a proponent of self-determination, 
however, it has been unable to conceptualize and operationalize the idea of self-
determination to generate a consistent application of policy. The United States has 
supported self-determination as a function of territorial integrity and political sovereignty 
for existing states, and with the recognition of Kosovo, has supported self-determination as 
a breach of territorial sovereignty for an existing state in order to enfranchise a stateless 
people. This double standard has confused United States policymakers as well as leadership 
worldwide, especially with regard to stateless peoples who have long been denied the same 
support that Kosovo has received from the America. 
 In statements made for public consumption, U.S. policymakers have offered a 
unified message to the international community that Kosovo is recognized as independent 
and sovereign because it is a “special case.” However, in exploring the elements of the self-
determination in Kosovo, juxtaposed with Palestine, this paper has argued that the two 
movements are not so unalike such as to warrant such drastically dissimilar treatment. Both 
have the elements of territorial, ethnic, and religious struggle, both have existed within 
states in which they have a degree of political autonomy; and both have taken the step of 
declaring independence. 
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The United States maintains that Kosovo is made more unique by its population’s 
subjection to ethnic cleansing campaigns and an unusual degree of involvement by 
international organizations. This paper has also explained that the population of Palestine 
has also sustained considerable suffering through ethnic cleansing by Israelis (although 
most policymakers, media, and scholars balk at the use of the term “ethnic cleansing” in this 
particular case) and that the United Nations has been involved, on varying levels, in the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict for over 50 years, more or less since the creation of the Israeli 
state. 
 While U.S. rhetoric exalts Kosovo as a special case, informal public speech by 
policymakers conveys two other reasons that America has fervently supported Kosovar 
independence, yet approached the Palestine’s bid for independence seldom with 
enthusiasm and often with apprehension. The United States, in the vein of Wendt’s social 
constructivist theory, has responded exceedingly well to the outpouring of pro-Americanism 
in Kosovo. Conversely, American support of Israel has inspired suspicion and frustration 
among Palestinians, which in some cases comes across as Anti-Americanism, and in other 
cases is merely interpreted as such. Either way, the United States has withheld overt 
support from a self-determination movement which sits atop the proverbial fence with 
regard to its attitude towards the U.S. 
 Secondly, U.S. policymakers have made it evident in informal addresses that Russia 
has played a critical role in the American support of Kosovo as an independent state. 
Because there is no sweeping ideological framework to replace ideas, beliefs, and politics 
ingrained during the Cold War, these attitudes and divisions linger into a political 
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environment in which they are no longer relevant.100 An increasingly opaque Russian 
political culture coupled with expanding wealth from the natural gas industry has presented 
a new challenge to United States policymakers, in which Russia has been interpreted as a 
foil to American ideals, economics, and global influence. Wendt argues that anarchy is the 
present nature of the international system and from that anarchy, states have, through 
their interaction, formed realist-style self-help political environment. Thus, the United 
States has sought to expand its sphere of influence by encouraging the cycle of support 
between America and Kosovo in order to minimize Russia’s influence in the Balkans.  
 It is evident that the manner in which foreign policy decisions are rationalized by 
policymakers in the United States is often superficial and rhetorical, but that these policies 
are developed through interactions with and perceptions of political circumstances and 
when practiced, give way to deeper motivations for policy implementation. This 
inconsistent treatment of like self-determination movements by United States foreign 
policy detracts from the international credibility of the United States, as well as agitates the 
less-favored groups and causes decreased stability in the regions in which these movements 
occur.  
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